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Scale, Diversity, and Determinants of Labour Migration in Europe
* 
 
While global migration is increasing, have only increased slowly. This paper contributes to a 
better understanding of the determinants and scale of European migration. It surveys 
previous historical experiences and empirical findings including the recent Eastern 
enlargements. The determinants of migration before and after the 2004 enlargement and in 
the EU15 and EU10 countries are analysed using individual data on migration intentions. In 
addition, perceptions about the size of migration after the enlargement are studied. The 
potential emigrant from both old and new EU member states tends to be young, better 
educated and to live in larger cities. People from the EU10 with children are less likely to 
move after enlargement in comparison to those without family. There exists a correlation 
between individual perceptions about the scale of migration and actual flows. Better educated 
and left-oriented individuals in the EU15 are less likely to perceive these flows as important. 
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Globalization and the recent Eastern enlargements of the European Union (EU) highlight the 
importance of migration-related issues in Europe, which is one of the main migration destinations in 
the world. In spite of substantial mobility barriers, immigration into the EU is large and dominates 
internal mobility, which is traditionally low. Less than 2% of EU working age citizens live in 
another EU member state, the majority originating from the old EU15 (European Commission, 
2006b). Labour migration from EU and non-EU countries has been a dominant feature of post 
World War II European migration, although it was only explicitly promoted during the 1960s and 
later by the EU enlargement and market integration policies. Over the last decade, one of the key 
questions that have attracted attention from scientists and policy-makers is immigration from 
Eastern Europe. Lay concerns about whether immigrants may depress wages, cause unemployment, 
exploit social security systems and generate social tensions have been contrasted with scientific 
emphasis on the economic needs of skilled workers by native firms and the creative potentials 
immigrants might carry with them.  
  In general, the economic impact of immigration on receiving labour markets depends on the 
scale of the immigration flows, the composition of the migrating population and the functioning of 
the receiving economy. How large has internal migration been in the EU15, the "old" European 
Union? Has and will mobility change after the 2004 enlargement with the admission of the EU10, 
the "new" member states? What drives migration in Europe and who were the potential migrants in 
the old and the new EU members before and after the enlargement? How is post-enlargement 
migration perceived by individuals in the EU25? These are the questions that we deal with in this 
paper.  
  The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II outlines the historical and 
conceptual background of European labour migration. Section III introduces the literature on EU 
Eastern enlargement. Section IV presents an empirical investigation on the determinants of 
migration intentions in the EU25 before and after enlargement. Section V analyses the perceptions 
on the scale of migration in the EU25 after enlargement. Section VI concludes and provides policy 
implications. 
 
II.  EUROPEAN LABOUR MIGRATION BEFORE EASTERN ENLARGEMENT 
 
  a. Historical background 
After World War II Western Europe became one of the main immigration regions of the world. 
Brücker et al. (2002), Bonifazi and Strozza (2001), Fassmann and Münz (1994), Jennissen et al. 
(2006), Zimmermann (1995b, 2005b), Tranaes and Zimmermann (2004) and Zimmermann et al. 
(2007) document the scale of migration and developments of migration policies in Europe. While 
the immigation issue is nothing new in many parts of Europe, non-EU migration has largely 
dominated internal EU migration. Migratory flows between EU countries are low. Only 0.1 % of 
the EU15 nationals move from one member state to another every year, although regional mobility 
within countries is significantly higher (European Commission, 2006b). Bonin et al. (2008) report 
that internal mobility within EU countries between 2000 and 2005 has been 1%, while it was 2% in 
Australia and 3% in the United States. 
  Several phases of European migration history can be distinguished. The first period of post-
war adjustment and decolonisation covering the years between 1945 and up to the early 1960s was a 
period of pure supply-driven migration. Germany experienced a strong inflow of people displaced 
by the war. The United Kingdom, France, Belgium and the Netherlands were affected by return 
migration from European colonies and the inflow of workers from the former overseas territories. In 
the United Kingdom, for instance, the immigrants came from the newly independent 
Commonwealth countries, beginning with the Caribbean countries and continuing with people from 
the Indian subcontinent. 
  1  The second phase of labour migration lasted until the first oil price crisis in 1973/74, and 
was motivated by the very strong economic growth at the time. The resulting labour shortages in the 
second half of the 1950s and the 1960s induced a number of Western European countries to open up 
for immigration. Germany, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark and Sweden 
actively recruited unskilled workers from the Southern European countries in a temporary scheme 
(established as guestworker system) which became permanent in many cases. Return migrants to 
Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France were also permanent, since they were 
the consequence of decolonisation.  
  Restrained migration was the third phase of post-war migration into Europe, where in the 
face of increased social tensions and fears about a recession after the first oil price shock, active 
labour recruitment was stopped from 1973 onwards. In spite of the fact that the guest-worker 
system was installed to foster temporary migration, return migration was sluggish. To the contrary, 
family reunification and humanitarian immigration went on. In sum, immigration from non-EU 
countries continued while net immigration from EU countries became low. 
  East-West migration and asylum seekers and refugees became the main channels in the 
fourth phase of the new immigration starting at the end of the 1980s. Ethnic Germans migrating to 
Germany played a substantial part in this. Whereas in the 1970s and 1980s, asylum seekers 
originated mainly from Asia and Africa, the inflow of asylum seekers and refugees from European 
countries increased significantly in the 1990s, originating in the dissolution of the political regimes 
in the former socialist states in Eastern Europe. The wars in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Kosovo caused a migration surge from these regions that followed established ethnic networks. 
Also the clashes between Turks and Kurds in the South-East of Turkey generated a substantial 
number of additional refugees. However, migration flows from the East have been fairly small and 
stabilized soon. 
  Around 1992 some European countries, especially Germany, became more restrictive 
towards the immigration of asylum seekers and refugees. While most European countries did not 
further restrict their refugee and asylum policies, Europe remained in practice largely closed for 
economic and non-economic migration resulting in the fifth phase of Fortress Europe. However, 
there are a number of notable exceptions including the United Kingdom, which received about a 
half million of immigrants from traditional source countries in the 1990s, but also Italy, Greece and 
Spain who became immigration countries. A substantial rise in perceived illegal immigration 
amends this picture. In recent years, the EU Commission has recognised the importance of skilled 
immigration from non-EU countries, but has so far failed to convince the member states of the need 
to establish a common European economic immigration policy. The United Kingdom is one of the 
EU countries that already executes a policy to attract such migrants from the new Eastern member 
states and non-EU countries under its Managed Migration policies and Highly Skilled Migrant 
Programme (Ruhs and Martin, 2008; Ruhs, 2007).  
 
  b. The migration decision 
The core analytical framework of the migration decision goes back to the human capital model of 
Sjaastad (1962) and Becker (1964). Theories and reviews of the migration decision can be found, 
for example, in Borjas (1999), Chiswick (1999), Greenwood, (1997) and Bauer and Zimmermann, 
(1999). According to some theories, migration flows respond largely to expected differences in 
regional disparities in prosperity (Harris and Todaro, 1970). Hence, differences in earnings, 
unemployment rates, costs of living, public goods and public transfers are also important 
determinants of a move. The decision to move is affected by the costs of moving that not only 
include monetary costs like travel expenses and foregone earnings, but also psychological costs 
arising from the separation from family and friends. The likelihood of migration should decrease 
with age, reflecting the smaller expected lifetime gain from moving for older people. Individuals 
with higher education should exhibit a higher migration probability, because higher education 
reduces the risks of migration through a higher ability to collect and process information. The risks 
  2and costs of movements are expected to rise with distance, because information about labour market 
conditions is expected to be better for closer locations. Family issues also typically play an 
important role (Mincer, 1978). Most migrants move within the context of ethnic networks, resulting 
in the formation of ethnic clusters in the host country (Massey, 1990). The mere existence of 
network and chain migration significantly alleviates the risks and costs and accelerates movement. 
Ethnic networks provide migrants with valuable information about jobs and access to local labour 
markets. Overall, migrants may be positively or negatively self-selected with respect to their 
characteristics (Borjas, 1987, Chiswick, 1999). The Roy model applied by Borjas (1987) also 
suggests that relative inequality matters and qualified migrants move from more (less) equal source 
countries to less (more) equal host countries. Consequently, countries with higher equality (and a 
lower Gini coefficient) should have higher emigration rates.  
  In practice, Europeans have proven to be fairly immobile (see Zimmermann, 1995a, 2005a, 
2005b and Bonin et. al, 2008, for further references and insights). Barriers which have been deemed 
as responsible for low European mobility rates include a number of micro and macro factors such as 
the rise of dual-earner households (joint mobility decisions being more difficult for such 
households), the rise in homeownership, the limited portability of social security entitlements, lack 
of recognition of foreign qualifications, the lack of innovation dynamics in the EU resulting in 
fewer job opportunities, the lack of jobs due to poor economic growth, the ageing of the working 
population, and poor EU-wide information flows about job markets. Ambiguous effects of new 
commuting perspectives through faster trains and cheaper airlines may stimulate or prevent 
migration decisions. For instance, lower transportation costs might stimulate commuting to a job, 
but lower the likelihood for a residential move. It may also encourage more regional job mobility 
than stimulate international migration by providing an easier access to a larger local labour market.  
  Mass unemployment has its own way of creating immobility: Jobless migrants rely stronger 
on local social networks than natives to keep in contact with society and to reintegrate in the labour 
market, which keeps mobility incentives low. Migration is also low because there are too many 
low-skilled and too few high-skilled individuals in the labour force with too few job offers for the 
former and too few workers from the latter job category. Regional mobility is also moderated by 
wage compression at the national levels. However, language and cultural differences are seen as the 
most problematic barriers of geographical mobility in Europe. Multicultural identities that could 
foster labour market integration (see Constant, Gataullina and Zimmermann, 2006, and Constant 
and Zimmermann, 2008) are not sufficiently developed. 
 
  c. European mobility at  work 
It is difficult to study mobility in Europe. First, geographic mobility is low and difficult to observe. 
Second, international migration cannot be measured by country surveys which only capture 
individuals before or after migration. Transnational surveys are missing. Third, migrants are not 
followed across countries, so that repeat, circular and chain migration cannot be studied.  Fourth, 
the definition of a migrant is not always clear. Official statistics may treat foreign nationals as 
migrants, ignoring naturalized individuals but including second generation immigrants who kept the 
citizenship of the country of origin. Finally, no updated and consistently gathered data sets are 
maintained which are sufficiently appropriate for examination of labour migration. Measuring 
migration intentions is a valuable step ahead, although these measures may overestimate the scale 
of mobility and focus only on the supply side (Boeri et. al., 2002). They still provide very valuable 
information on the characteristics of potential migrants. We will discuss the value of intention 
measures further in section IV. Most recent studies of migration intentions were undertaken in the 
context of EU enlargement. (See also Bauer and Zimmermann, 1997, 1998 for early investigations 
of the labour market implications of EU East enlargements.) 
  The characterisation of migrants is severely handicapped by data limitations, involving both 
the definition of what is to be measured (foreign-born, foreign nationality) and the location and 
recording of those to be counted. The United Nations (UN), the International Labour Office (ILO), 
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Statistical Office (Eurostat) all provide relevant measures, but typically with conflicting definitions 
and incomplete recording. Tables 1 and 2 attempt to capture the best picture relevant to the purpose 
under investigation in this paper making use of Eurostat and OECD data sources and from the EU 
Labour Force Surveys (LFS). Migrants can be defined or classified as individuals born outside of 
the country (foreign-born), people with a foreign nationality, persons who have a migratory 
background (parents were foreign-born) or migrants with a particular duration of residence. 
Obviously, there are foreign-born natives, foreign citizens born in the host country, foreign-born 
foreigners who have taken the citizenship of the host country and individuals with double 
citizenships. This suggests that the measurement of migration can be difficult. 
  Table 1 provides information on the level and trends of migration measured by the share of 
migrants in the total population of the receiving countries for the EU27. It documents the migration 
stock from two different data sources (Eurostat and OECD), for two years and two definitions 
(citizenship and foreign-born). This table has to be interpreted with caution, since reporting 
procedures differ across countries and sources and for many countries data is missing.
1 Although 
providing an incomplete picture of European migration and confirming a poor state of migration 
statistics, this table suggests several interesting facts.  
  The size of migration is rising for the EU15, while it is stagnant for the EU12, the new 
member states. If anything, the standard deviation is rising for the old EU and falling for the EU12. 
Cyprus, United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Ireland have all seen substantial increases of 
the foreigner share in the total population over the period of 2000 to 2006. The rise in the share of 
foreign-born is substantial for most of the countries (mainly from the EU15), for which the data is 
available, perhaps with the exceptions of Sweden, Luxembourg and Germany. There are typically 
more foreign-born in the country than foreign nationals with the exception of Luxembourg. There 
exist differences in the relative shares of foreign nationals between the OECD and Eurostat data for 
Greece, Ireland and Spain in 2006/2005, but only for Greece in 2000/1999. 
  Table 2 shows numbers from the 2006 EU Labour Force Survey for the share of foreign 
citizens and foreign-born differentiating between EU and non-EU region of origin. The results are 
broadly consistent with the findings in Table 1, although there exist several differences. Among the 
foreign national shares, Luxembourg and Belgium rank first for other EU nationals, while Ireland 
and Austria are first for the non-EU foreigners. Among the other EU foreign-born, again 
Luxembourg and Belgium clearly dominate. However, among the non-EU foreign-born, the picture 
is more equal: Sweden and Austria are ahead followed by France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, 
and the Netherlands.  
 
III. EASTERN ENLARGEMENT OF THE EU    
 
  a. The background 
In May 2004, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia joined the European Union, followed by Bulgaria and Romania in January 
2007. These enlargements were unprecedented: income differentials between the Central and 
Eastern European countries (CEEC) and EU15 were large, unemployment was high, migration from 
these countries was restricted, and they had undergone a transition from socialist to market 
economies. Potentially, there were strong economic incentives in the CEEC to migrate. 
  Due to the concerns about negative effects on the labour markets and “welfare tourism” 
transitional periods of up to seven years were imposed for workers from the new member states 
with the exception of Malta and Cyprus. These transitional arrangements are based on a so-called 
“2+3+2” formula, and had to be reviewed two years after the enlargements, and again three years 
                                                 
1 We have compared figures from Eurostat online database for 2000 (column 1) with those in Eurostat Population 
Statistics (2006). With several exceptions, the figures were largely similar. 
  4later. A final two-year phase of restrictions is permitted only in cases of serious disturbances in 
countries’ labour markets. Only the United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden have opened up their 
labour markets immediately in 2004. The United Kingdom, however, adopted a mandatory 
Worker's Registration Scheme (WRS), under which workers coming from the EU8 countries had to 
register with the Home Office. Following the review based on the EU Commission’s Report (2006), 
seven more member states have decided to lift restrictions in 2006 and 2007 (Spain, Finland, 
Greece, Portugal, Italy, the  Netherlands, Luxembourg) while others have simplified their 
procedures (Belgium, France, Denmark,  Germany). As for Bulgaria and Romania, ten EU25 
member states (Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Finland and Sweden) have liberalized access to their labour markets, while the rest have decided to 
maintain the restrictions.  
  How large was the scale of migration before and after the enlargement? It is difficult to 
provide a comprehensive picture as the statistical data are still very preliminary and often not 
available. Figure 1 shows net immigration rates (net flows divided by the population of the 
receiving country) for the EU15 member states with available data from the Eurostat online 
database. It suggests that there was an increase in immigration from the new member states in most 
of the countries, for which the data is available. However, in many cases the size of this increase 
was small. In the United Kingdom the gross data suggests that the increase was relatively large. In 
Sweden there is a larger increase in net migration in 2006. While in the majority of these countries 
Poland is the main sending country, it is Estonia for Finland and Romania for Spain. This suggests 
that geography, language, country size and networks matter. 
  Unfortunately, there are no Eurostat data available for Ireland, in which the increase has 
been large. Blanchflower et al. (2007) and Ruhs (2007) have recently documented the inflow for the 
United Kingdom and Hughes (2007) for Ireland. Measured by the Personal Public Service Numbers 
(PPSN) that Ireland issues to EU10 nationals, there were about 54,000 immigrants in May-
December 2004, 112,000 in 2005, and 139,000 in 2006. For the United Kingdom, the most recent 
Accession Monitoring Report (Home Office, 2008) provides statistics on the policy of the British 
government to regulate inflows and to restrict access to benefits. According to this report, the 
number of applicants to the WRS has risen from 134,550 in May-December 2004 to 234,725 in 
2006 and fallen slightly to 217,740 in 2007 (see Figure 2). The majority of applicants are from 
Poland. However, both Irish and British measures capture only gross inflows and are likely to 
overstate the long-term permanent immigration, since much of it is of temporary nature. For 
example, in March 2008 in the United Kingdom 60% of applicants intended to stay for less than 
three months (Home Office, 2008).  
 
  b. Review of selected studies on potential and actual migration 
Since 1990, several studies have attempted to predict future migration flows from the new member 
states. (For surveys see, among others, Alvarez-Plata et al., 2003; Boeri and Brücker, 2005; Zaiceva 
and Zimmermann, 2008.) It is difficult to compare the results of these studies since they vary in 
methodology and in the range of variables included in the model. Nevertheless, in spite of large 
heterogeneity, most of them find that between 2% and 4% of the population of the Central and 
Eastern European countries will move to the West in the long run, which would constitute about 1% 
of the EU15 population.  
  The current literature can be divided into two broad groups: (i) predictions based on the 
intentions to move to the West using surveys, and (ii) extrapolations or forecasts based on historical 
data for countries other than the new member states. The main advantages of the former 
methodology include availability of individual characteristics, and the possibility to distinguish 
between short- and medium-term migration (and commuting). However, it is difficult to determine 
how close the intentions are to actual realizations (see Section IV). In general, the migration 
potential in these studies ranges between 1% and 4% of the 2004 accession countries’ population, 
and it is higher for nationals from Bulgaria and Romania (see, for example, Fassmann and 
  5Hintermann, 1997, Krieger, 2004). Wallace (1998) reports higher numbers (7%-14%), and also 
shows that one of the most preferred options of geographic mobility is cross-border commuting. It 
is the young, well-educated, and those without family who are more willing to emigrate.  
  Extrapolations or forecasts based on historical data arrive at several conclusions regarding 
the migration scale (see, for example, Layard et al., 1992; Franzmeyer and Brücker, 1997; Bauer 
and Zimmermann, 1999; Hille and Straubhaar, 2001; Sinn et al., 2001; Fertig and Schmidt, 2001; 
Dustmann et al., 2003; Alvarez-Plata et al., 2003; Boeri and Brücker, 2005; Zaiceva, 2006). Based 
on econometric estimates from historical experiences with EU Southern enlargement for the periods 
of restricted and free mobility, Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) simulate potential migration to range 
from 0.15% in Slovenia to 6.54% in Romania. Unsurprisingly, potential migration is higher in a 
“free mobility” scenario, where simulations are based on estimates from the period with unrestricted 
mobility. Boeri and Brücker (2001) find that under the free mobility assumption, 3.5% of the 
Central and Eastern European population will move to the EU15 by 2030. Alvarez-Plata et al. 
(2003), an update of Boeri and Brücker (2001), estimate a slightly lower migration potential. They 
also find that transitional periods tend to postpone migration, but have only a marginal impact. Note 
that such projections are subject to many problems related to the strong assumptions imposed.  
  Several recent studies have evaluated the actual migration after the enlargement. According 
to the EU Commission’s Report (2006), the overall increase in immigration after 2004 was rather 
limited and was attributable mainly to the increases in Austria, Ireland and the United Kingdom. It 
also suggests that there is no conclusive evidence on a direct link between the scale of migration 
and the transitional arrangements. Gilpin et al. (2006) report that in the United Kingdom, the 
number of nationals from the new member states increased substantially, but do not find a 
statistically significant link between increased immigration and the rise in the United Kingdom 
claimant unemployment. Blanchflower et al. (2007) show that the propensity to migrate is 
correlated with income per capita, unemployment rates and life satisfaction in the new member 
states and also find no negative impact on the British economy. Ruhs (2007) discusses the 
migration policy context of opening up the borders and argues that there is a need for stronger 
enforcement of labour laws and regulations aimed at immigrants from the new member states. 
Doyle et al. (2006) document a small increase in immigration from the new member states in 
Sweden. Wadensjö (2007) provides updated figures. There is a remarkable increase in the number 
of foreigners in Ireland between 2003 and 2005, and the majority of this flow in 2005 consisted of 
nationals from the new member states. The authors also argue that the immigration to Ireland is 
primarily demand-driven and does not generate displacement effects on the aggregate level.  
  All these studies report that the majority of migrants are male, young, come from Poland and 
the Baltic states, have relatively high or medium skill levels and are concentrated in low-skilled 
sectors. No evidence of “welfare tourism” was found. Indeed, our own analysis using the British 
Labour Force Survey (see Table A6) shows that the proportion of recent immigrants from the EU10 
countries claiming benefits in the United Kingdom is the same as from the EU15 countries, and 
childcare benefits account for more than 70% of the benefits taken up by East European. Finally, 
Brenke and Zimmermann (2007) document an increase in net immigration flows from the new 
member states into Germany despite the “closed door” policy. The authors show that females 
constitute the majority of these immigrants, and that these immigrants are underrepresented in 
highly qualified jobs despite high qualifications, that they exhibit a lower employment rate than 
natives and show that self-employment was used as a possible channel of entry to Germany. 
  Would immigration have increased as significantly in Ireland and the United Kingdom in the 
absence of the diverse transitional arrangements? It is likely that a “migration diversion” has 
occurred into the countries that have opened up their labour markets early (Boeri and Brücker, 
2005). Otherwise, network effects and geographical closeness would have attracted many more 
migrants to Austria and Germany than actually went. However, other factors may have also 
contributed to the unexpectedly strong rise of Eastern immigrants: Many immigrants have studied 
English at home or would like to study it in these countries (Anderson et al., 2006). Enlargement 
  6may have contributed to the legalization of previously illegal immigrants, which would imply a 
pure statistical effect. Finally, a demand-driven immigration in the case of Ireland was likely to 
occur in any case to fill in the available vacancies.  
 
 
IV. DETERMINANTS OF MIGRATION INTENTIONS IN EU25 BEFORE AND AFTER 
ENLARGEMENT 
 
The studies surveyed above suggest that migrants in Europe possess certain individual 
characteristics which distinguish them from non-migrants. In the absence of longitudinal cross-
country migration data, intentions to move provide a potential to identify and investigate these 
differences. Such an analysis typically assumes that intentions are a monotonic function of the 
underlying variables that determine actual migration behaviour. Obviously, there exists a gap 
between migration intentions and their realizations that will be the larger the larger the barriers are 
to enter the host countries and the less information is available about the host countries’ labour 
markets and policies.  
  We follow here a broad strand of literature that analyses migration intentions in different 
countries including, for example, Burda (1993) for Germany, Ahn et al., (1999) for Spain, Epstein 
and Gang (2006) for Hungary, Fidrmuc and Huber,(2007) for the Czech Republic, Liebig and 
Sousa-Poza (2004) for 23 countries, Drinkwater, (2003) for Central and Eastern European 
countries, Krieger (2004) for accession countries, Fouarge and Ester (2007a, 2007b) and Bonin et 
al. (2008) for the EU25. This literature relies on a high correlation between migration intentions and 
their realisations. 
   In socio-psychological theory actions depend on the intentions to perform them, which in 
turn are functions of attitudes towards that behaviour and the perceived subjective norms about 
performing that behaviour (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975, Ajzen, 1988). Thus, intentions data provide 
very valuable information, but are only imperfectly correlated with future behaviour and have to be 
treated with caution (Manski, 1990, Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001).  
Several studies confirm that migration intentions are indeed closely related to the subsequent 
move. Gordon and Molho (1995) find that around 90% of British respondents who expressed an 
intention to migrate, did move within five years. Böheim and Taylor (2002) using panel data for 
Britain show that those who expressed a preference for moving experience three times higher 
probability of moving. Dustmann (2003) using panel data for Germany reports that of those 
immigrants who returned to their countries of origin from Germany during 1984-1997, 84% 
indicated in 1984 that they have the intention to return. 
  A different approach is undertaken in Blanchflower et al. (2007). The authors analyse the 
characteristics of immigrants from the new EU member states in the United Kingdom and find that 
they are “highly consistent” with the individual determinants of the intentions to move to another 
European country from the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 2002 data. They argue that 
“intentions appear to be highly correlated with subsequent actions” (p. 13). Examining the 
characteristics of pre- and post-enlargement migrants for the United Kingdom using the 
Eurobarometer data and the British Labour Force Survey (see Table A6)  shows that they are indeed 
largely in line with the determinants of migration intentions presented in this section. 
  There exist several additional reasons why using intentions data is valuable. First, migrants 
may be positively or negatively selected. Analyzing determinants of potential migration in the 
sending countries may mitigate some of the selection problems, which are present in host country 
data due to selective immigration policy, geographic proximity and historical links (Liebig and 
Sousa-Poza, 2004). Second, understanding determinants of migration intentions may help designing 
effective targeted migration policies (Fouarge and Ester, 2007b). Finally, if anything migration 
intentions data are expected to overestimate the magnitude of potential emigration. Here, however, 
  7we are interested in the identification of the determinants of the migration decision that are 
probably less biased.  
  Several studies have analysed migration intentions from different Central and Eastern 
European countries. For example, Krieger (2004) presents several tabulations of individual 
characteristics in order to identify potential migrants from this region in 2002. Recent work by 
Fouarge and Ester (2007a, b) characterise migration intentions for the old and new EU member 
states for 2001, 2002 and 2005 and analyse their determinants in 2005. The novel feature here is 
that we focus on the determinants of migration intentions before and after the enlargement and 
analyse their changes in EU10 and EU15 countries. 
  We use the 2001, 2002 and 2005 waves of the Eurobarometer data and focus on the question 
regarding migration intentions in the next five years. (See Appendix for the exact wording of these 
questions.) The dependent variable equals 1 if the respondent answers that she intends to move 
within the same city or region, equals 2 if she intends to move to another region within the country 
and equals 3 if she intends to move abroad.
2 We need to combine EU and non-EU destinations into 
one, since the number of respondents with inclinations to move to a non-EU country is negligible. 
In the descriptive analysis, however, we differentiate between these two destinations. Intending to 
focus on labour migration, we drop pensioners and students, and keep individuals between 18 and 
64 years old with non-missing information on the key explanatory variables.  
  Figure 3 reports percentages of individuals with intentions to move to another EU country 
and to a non-EU country before and after enlargement. It shows that emigration intentions in 2005 
in the EU10 are on average higher than in EU15, and they are on average lower in 2002. There are 
also differences in the preferred destinations: while in 2005, 2.4% of the respondents in EU15 
reported another EU country as a preferred destination, the corresponding number for EU10 was 
around 4%, and the proportions were similar before the enlargement. On the other hand, the 
proportion of those willing to emigrate to a non-EU country is larger in the EU15 than in the EU10 
both before and after enlargement.  
  We expect young individuals to express a higher willingness to migrate, since the time to 
reap the expected returns from migration is longer for them. More educated individuals are also 
expected to have larger moving intentions, since they probably face lower costs of migration and 
job search. On the other hand, married individuals and those with children are expected to have 
lower willingness to migrate because of the psychic costs of separating from their family. Home 
owners are expected to have lower migration intentions, because of their greater attachment to the 
region and since they may face the additional costs of selling their property. Regarding labour 
market status, unemployed individuals may be more willing to look for a job abroad. However, they 
may also be attached stronger to social networks and experience liquidity constraints that could 
preclude them from moving. Previous migration experience is expected to stimulate migration via 
lower information uncertainties and established migration networks. In addition, migration may also 
lead to the increased marital instability that in turn would lead to more migration (Mincer, 1978). 
Table 3 (see also Tables A2 and A3 covering the complete estimation process) shows 
marginal effects from the multinomial logit regressions for the moving abroad outcome relative to 
those not willing to move anywhere. Let us first focus on the EU10 and compare the determinants 
before and after the enlargement. The results are consistent with the human capital migration 
theory. In general, the impact of individual characteristics is stronger after enlargement.
3 Older 
individuals and those living in rural areas and small towns are less willing to emigrate. Potential 
                                                 
2 Note that in principle multiple answers are possible. Following Fouarge and Ester (2007a) we generate this variable 
according to the longest intended move.  
3  In a pooled model for 2002 and 2005 for the EU10, a 2005 dummy was positive and significant confirming higher 
immigration intentions after the enlargements. However, its interactions with education and children dummies were 
not significant. Note also that these are pooled cross-sectional data, and the results may be due to the change in the 
composition of the sample. 
  8migrants are positively selected with respect to education and the positive impact of human capital 
is larger after the enlargement. Previous migration experience also matters. With the exception of 
the inactivity status, labour market status variables are insignificant both before and after 
enlargement.  
Being satisfied with the salary
4 decreases the willingness to emigrate. Note, however, that 
the latter variable is an interaction between employment and satisfaction with the salary. When 
estimating the regressions without it, being unemployed becomes significant and positive in the 
EU10 after the enlargement. This suggests that, in 2005, unemployed have no significantly different 
intentions to emigrate relative to white-collar employees who are not satisfied with their salary. 
However, relative to white-collar employees in general, unemployed have a higher willingness to 
move. Finally, there is an interesting change in gender and family characteristics. While, before 
enlargement, the willingness to emigrate of women and individuals with children was not 
statistically significant, after enlargement it is and they are less willing to move than men and 
individuals without children. Being alone (single, divorced, separated or widowed) is also 
significantly rising the mobility intentions after enlargement. Coefficients on country dummies (not 
reported here) show that while before enlargement the largest positive effect for intentions to move 




6 the situation is mixed. However, those characteristics that mattered 
before the enlargement remain significant and have the expected signs after enlargement with the 
exception of labour market variables. Blue-collar workers, self-employed and the inactive have a 
lower willingness to move compared to the white-collar workers in 2001, but the correlations 
become insignificant (at the 5 percent level) in 2005. As in the EU10, the unemployed dummy is 
insignificant, while satisfaction with the salary is negative and significant. Now, however, the 
unemployment status remains insignificant even in the absence of the satisfaction dummy. The 
largest intentions to emigrate relative to Germany are in the United Kingdom and Sweden in 2005 
and in the United Kingdom and Luxembourg in 2001. That may also capture the intentions of 
immigrants to return home, although we control for previous migration experience.  
    Finally,  comparing  old  and  new member states before and after the enlargement yields 
interesting results. Before the enlargement, females, individuals with children, blue-collar workers 
and self-employed had lower emigration intentions in the EU15, but not in the EU10. After the 
enlargement, there are no qualitative differences in the determinants of migration intentions in these 
two regions.     
  Regarding regional mobility (see Tables A2 and A3), age, education and home ownership 
yield expected results for both EU10 and EU15 and both before and after the enlargement. Blue-
collar workers in 2005 had a lower willingness to move within and across regions in the EU10 and 
across regions in the EU15, while inactive had a lower intentions to move across regions in the 
EU15. Individuals living in small towns in EU10 countries had higher intentions to move to another 
regions both before and after the enlargement. Satisfaction with the salary, in general, affects 
negatively within-country mobility intentions in the EU15 (with the exception of within-region 
move in 2001), and in the EU10 it is significant only for the cross-regional mobility in 2005.       
                                                 
4 Since this question was asked only for the employed in 2005 and 2001 (in 2002 all individuals were asked if they are 
satisfied with their financial situation), we imposed it equal to zero for those not employed in all years. We have also 
estimated the model without the satisfaction variable and the results were qualitatively very similar.  
5 Regarding occupations, our analysis shows that the majority of those willing to move abroad are skilled manual 
workers both before and after enlargement, but also middle managers before and employed professionals after 
enlargement (see Table A6). That may have important implications for designing appropriate immigration policies.     
6 Note that marital status variables were not available in the 2001 data, but we expect that household size and children 
variables capture that effect. Also, home ownership was missing, however it was not significant (at the 5 percent 
level) neither in 2005 nor for the EU10 countries.   
  9  Different “push” factors may influence emigration decisions from a macro level. (See 
Zimmermann, 1995b, for a discussion of “push” and “pull” factors of European migration.) Table 4 
(see also Tables A4 and A5) provides some evidence.
7 In the EU10, as was expected, the higher 
GDP per capita, the less willing are individuals to emigrate, but the effect before enlargement is 
significant only at the 10 percent level.
8 This seems to be consistent with the catching up process in 
the new member states when the income differentials between sending and receiving countries 
become smaller and potential emigration is negatively affected. In the EU15, the larger is GDP per 
capita, the larger are the intentions to emigrate in 2001.
9 Potential explanations may include tax 
considerations or return intentions. (Note, however, that we control for individual characteristics as 
mentioned above.) The unemployment rate does not significantly affect the emigration intentions 
when considered at a 5% level.  
  Selection effects are an important issue for the analysis of migration (Roy, 1951, Borjas, 
1987, Chiswick, 1999). Although, we do not attempt to rigorously test selectivity here, we have 
experimented with adding the Gini coefficient into the regressions for the EU10 countries for 2005 
(see Liebig and Sousa-Poza, 2004). Note, however, that the data on the potential destination 
countries, and thus on the relative inequality is not available. The Gini coefficient is highly 
significant and positive implying that higher inequality is associated with higher willingness to 
emigrate (see Table A5).
10 Note also the existence of positive self-selection on observables as 
emigration intentions increase with the years of schooling. This is consistent with Liebig and Sousa-
Poza (2004) where migration intentions data are used and positive self-selection is suggested, as 
well as with Chiswick (1999) and Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) that show that positive self-selection 
may occur in countries with high inequality if migration costs are lower for the highly skilled. We 
did not find evidence, however, of the attenuation of this effect, since the interaction between 
education and Gini index was not significant. Note also that the GDP per capita variable becomes 
insignificant once the Gini index is added into the regressions. 
  Although not a complete test of the Roy-Borjas model, these findings are interesting on their 
own. Since the majority of the EU10 countries are former socialist economies, in which income 
distribution was more egalitarian, higher willingness to emigrate in countries with higher inequality 
may be important for policy-makers. On the other hand, if these results are able to capture the 
potential self-selection effects, they have important policy implications also for the receiving 
countries. As pointed out in Liebig and Sousa-Poza (2004), receiving countries with relatively more 
equal income distribution, such as Sweden or Germany, may not attract more low skilled people, 
but may experience skilled immigration, though the positive selectivity will be more pronounced in 
countries with a higher inequality, such as the UK (p. 141). In addition, Constant and Zimmermann 
(2005) provide evidence that Germany and Denmark could benefit from more pro-active 
recruitment and integration policies targeted at immigrants with strong economic performance, such 
as selection of skilled migrants.  





                                                 
7 We have also estimated a binary choice model for the intentions to emigrate with macroeconomic variables and the 
results were essentially the same. 
8 We have also experimented with GDP per capita squared to test the migration “hump” hypothesis (see Hatton and 
Williamson, 2002). However, for the EU10 both GDP and GDP squared were insignificant. 
9 For the EU15 both GDP and GDP squared were insignificant in the 2005 regressions, and we found evidence for an 
inverse U-shape relation for 2001. However, other reasons than liquidity constraints mentioned in the literature are 
likely to drive that relation. 
10 In Fouarge and Ester (2007), the Gini coefficient was insignificant in the pooled regression for EU25 in 2005. 
  10V. SCALE OF POST-ENLARGEMENT MIGRATION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
ATTITUDES IN EU25 
 
 This section of the paper is devoted to the analysis of perceptions about the scale of migration after 
the 2004 enlargement. We know from Section III that actual migration flows have increased more 
than was expected in the UK and Ireland while the inflow was less than expected in Sweden. These 
three countries have opened up their labour markets immediately in 2004 while most other EU 
countries remained closed due to public concerns about potential mass immigration. What are 
public perceptions across countries about the actual magnitude of migration in Europe? What 
factors drive those attitudes? Is there a correlation between these perceptions and actual migration 
flows? These are the issues we focus on in this section. 
  We use the 2006 Eurobarometer data and examine the following question:  
“According to you, after the last enlargement of the European Union that took place in May 2004, 
migration flows between the 10 new Member States and the 15 old Member States have been: 1) 
very important, 2) fairly important, 3) fairly limited, 4) very limited, 5) don’t know.” 
11  
We construct a binary dependent variable, which is equal to 1 if a respondent thinks migration 
flows were very or fairly important, and 0 if she thinks they were limited.
12 While constructing the 
sample, we keep individuals between 18 and 64 years old, those with non-missing information and 
focus on the EU25 countries. Figure 4 shows the distribution of migration perceptions by country 
for the final sample. Overall, around 65% of respondents in the EU25 think that post-enlargement 
migration was “important” (as opposed to “limited”) and the figure is slightly larger in the new than 
in the old member states. There exists a large variation in answers between member states.  
  Among the EU15 (see panel a of Figure 4), Ireland has the largest proportion of individuals 
with positive answers (around 95%), and Sweden has the smallest (around 30%). Among the EU10, 
the proportion is the highest in Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Interestingly, those countries in which 
immigration from the East or emigration to the West was large (see Section III) seem to report a 
higher perception of migration and vice versa. This suggests that there exists a potential correlation 
between actual migration and individual attitudes about its magnitude. Note, however, that these 
attitudes may originate from at least three different sources – personal migration experience, 
respondent’s level of information and education, and attitudes towards immigration in general. In 
the regressions below we control for such individual characteristics. 
  We treat individual answers as indicative about their opinion on the magnitude of migration 
after the 2004 enlargement. Several factors support that. First, the preceding question asked in the 
Eurobarometer is whether the value of exports of the EU15 to the new EU10 countries “has been 
bigger, smaller or equal” to the value of their imports. After having answered this question, 
respondents are more likely to think about the magnitude of migration than about its impacts. 
Second, there exists a significant correlation with other questions on the magnitude of migration 
after the enlargement (whether enlargement increases settlement of workers coming from future 
member states of the EU and whether enlargement facilitates mobility of people within Europe). 
Nevertheless, we do acknowledge that respondents may have the impacts of migration in mind.  
  We expect that the attitudes towards the scale of migration are related to those towards 
immigration in general. (For studies on the attitudes towards migrants in general see, for instance, 
Bauer et al., 2000; Gang et al., 2002; Dustmann and Preston, 2006; Mayda, 2006.) The determinants 
of both are expected to be related. Indeed, immigration attitudes are likely to be an important 
determinant of actual migration flows as individual preferences affect the demand side of the 
market through voting and immigration policies (Mayda, 2006).    
                                                 
11 Note that responses in the “don’t know” category were treated as missing observations. The proportion of 
respondents with such answers was 20%. 
12 We have also estimated an ordered probit model using the multiple responses, but report the binary results only  since 
we got no different conclusions.  
  11  Both economic and non-economic factors determine individual attitudes towards 
immigrants, the scale of immigration, and thus preferences on immigration policy. Both labour 
market considerations, welfare considerations and racial attitudes matter (Dustmann and Preston, 
2007). It is also found that anti-immigration attitudes are higher in regions with a higher 
concentration of foreigners. (See, for example, Gang et al, 2002 for a study with Eurobarometer 
data.) Here we do not test this hypothesis. Instead, we analyse whether there exists a correlation 
between the actual migration flows and individual attitudes towards the scale of migration. 
  The basic economic model of the effects of immigration postulates that natives who are 
substitutes to immigrants lose from immigration, while those who are complements gain. The 
evidence above suggests that immigrants coming from the new member states to the old EU15 self-
select themselves into relatively low-skilled sectors and occupations. We thus expect that highly 
skilled natives in the EU15 would not perceive immigration from the EU10 as a large-scale event, 
while the opposite would hold for the low-skilled natives. Indeed, we find that highly educated 
individuals in the EU15 are less likely to think that migration flows after enlargement were 
“important”, while blue-collar workers are somewhat more likely to think so (see Table 5). On the 
other hand, better educated individuals are more likely to be better informed about the magnitude of 
migration in the EU. Finally, it is also possible that answers of less-skilled individuals in may 
reflect their fears about negative impacts of immigrations and vice versa for highly skilled 
respondents. Interestingly, we do not find the unemployed variable to be significant. In addition, in 
the EU10, one additional year of schooling decreases the likelihood to perceive post-enlargement 
migration as “important” by around 1 percentage point in spite of the higher willingness to move 
abroad for the highly educated (see Scetion IV).  
Left-oriented individuals are less likely to report that migration flows after the enlargement 
were “important” reflecting most likely pro-immigration attitudes in general. Indeed, this variable is 
significant only in the EU15. Older respondents are less likely to perceive migration as important in 
the new member states. This is consistent with the findings in Section IV that actual and potential 
migrants from EU10 are young. Females are also more likely to think that migration was important 
reflecting probably a relatively high proportion of female emigrants from the new EU members.
13  
  Finally, let us examine the correlation between actual migration flows after the 2004 
enlargement and individuals’ perceptions about them. Migration flows are defined as follows: We 
calculated emigration from each of the EU10 countries into each of EU15 countries from the 
Eurostat immigration flows statistics for the EU15 for 2005. Note, however, that the data is 
unavailable for Ireland and Greece. For the EU15, we use resident / work permit data from the EU 
Commission Report (2006), Table A1. Table 6 shows marginal effects from logit regressions, in 
which we replace the country dummies by the actual migration flows as well as GDP per capita and 
the unemployment rate. This table clearly shows that there exists a positive relation between actual 
migration flows after the 2004 enlargement and people’s perceptions about their magnitude, and the 




While the rise in migration is a global phenomenon, Europeans have remained fairly immobile. 
After the 2004 enlargement, migration flows have increased, but the increase on average was 
limited, although Ireland and the UK were affected most (EU Commission, 2006a). The dynamics 
of the migration stems from the rising share of non-EU immigrants pointing at a greater need to (i) 
remove barriers to internal EU mobility (Bonin et al., 2008) and (ii) to better select and integrate 
                                                 
13 We have also experimented with the “satisfaction with financial situation” variable However, it was not significantly 
different from zero.  
 
  12non-EU immigrants (Zimmermann, 2005a). Skills shortages combined with demographic 
challenges call for more mobility, especially of the highly skilled.   
  The analysis in this paper suggests that in line with human capital theory potential migrants 
from both EU10 and EU15 continue to be young and better educated. In the EU10, the positive 
impact of human capital is stronger, but family considerations are likely to become a mobility 
barrier after the enlargement. It is unlikely that actual labour mobility will increase significantly in 
Europe. In 2006, the proportion of individuals thinking about “living in another member state in 
order to work” was around 15% in the EU10 and 9% in the EU15. However, the shares of those 
who “thought of it, but gave up the idea” were around 13% and 11 %, respectively (Eurobarometer 
65.1, see Table A8). Since social and cultural barriers are likely to persist, policies aiming at 
facilitating integration, housing, language skills and early mobility experience are needed. 
  This study also suggests that there exists a correlation between individual perceptions about 
the scale of post-enlargement migration and actual migration flows, and that better educated and 
left-oriented individuals in the EU15 are less likely to perceive these flows as “important”. On the 
other hand, only around 50% of respondents in the EU15 think that immigrants are needed for 
working in certain sectors of the economy (Eurobarometer 64.2, see Table A7). Individual attitudes 
about migration and its scale are important for policy. After accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 
2007, only Finland and Sweden have opened up their labour markets for their migrants among the 
old EU15. These are countries where migration flows after the 2004 enlargement were small, and 
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  17Table 1: International migration stock (in % of total population) 
 
 
  Eurostat OECD 
  2000 2006 1999 2005 1999 2005 
  foreign citizens  foreign citizens  foreign-born 
E U 1 5 :         
Austria  9.5 9.8 8.7 9.7  10.9  13.5 
Belgium  8.3 8.6 8.8 8.6  10.2  12.1 
Denmark  4.9 5.0 4.9 5.0 5.6 6.5 
Finland  1.7 2.2 1.7 2.2 2.5  3.4 
France  5.4 5.6 5.6    7.3 8.1 
Germany  8.9 8.8 8.9 8.8  12.4 12.9 
Greece  6.9 7.9 2.6 5.2  10.3   
Ireland  3.3 7.4 3.1 6.3 8.2 11.0 
Italy  2.2 4.5 2.2 4.6 2.5   
Luxembourg  36.8 39.6 36.0 39.6 32.8 33.4 
Netherlands  4.1 4.2 4.1 4.2 9.8  10.6 
Portugal  1.9 2.6 1.9 4.1 5.1 6.3 
Spain  2.3 9.1 2.0 6.2 5.3   
Sweden  5.5 5.3 5.5 5.3  11.8  12.4 
United  Kingdom  4.2 5.7 3.8 5.2 7.6 9.7 
Average  EU15  7.1 8.4 6.7 8.2 9.5  11.7 
Standard 
deviation  EU15  8.6 8.9 8.5 9.3 7.2 7.5 
E U 1 2 :         
Bulgaria  0.3  0.3      
Cyprus  8.4  12.8      
Czech Republic  2.2 2.5 2.2 2.7 4.4 5.1 
Estonia  20.0  18.0      
Hungary  1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.9 3.3 
Latvia  26.0  19.9      
Lithuania  1.0  1.0      
Malta  2.3  3.0      
Poland  1.8  1.8      1.6 
Romania  0.8  0.1      
Slovakia  0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 2.5 3.9 
Slovenia  2.1  2.4      
Average  EU12  5.6  5.3      
Standard 
deviation  EU12  8.5  7.2      
 
Sources: OECD (2007), Tables A.1.4 and A.1.5 for columns 3-6 and own calculations 
based on population by citizenship data from the Eurostat online database for columns 
1-2 (www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat, June 2008). 
 
Notes: The Eurostat data refer to January 1, while the OECD data refer to December 31 
(with several exceptions). In the Eurostat data, instead of 2000 only the following year 
is available: Greece 2001 (provisional value), France 1999, Lithuania 2001, Poland 
2002, Slovakia 2003, Bulgaria 2001, Romania 2002. In the OECD data, instead of 1999 
only 2001 is available for Greece, Italy, Slovakia, and Spain; instead of 2005 for 
Germany it is 2003, for Poland 2002, for Slovakia 2004. Estimated figures by OECD 
are in italics. The differences between the two data sources may arise also from the 
different reporting procedures (see OECD, 2007, p.342-343 and 356-357). For the 
empty slots there are no data available.  
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Table 2: Proportion of foreign-born and foreign citizens in European Union countries by 
region of origin (other EU, non-EU) in % of total population, 2006 
 
  Foreign citizens  Foreign-born  Total foreign-
born
4  
  Other EU  Non-EU  Other EU  Non-EU   
EU15:          
Austria 2.0  5.3  3.8  7.5  11.4 
Belgium 6.0  2.8  6.4  6.3  12.7 
Denmark 0.9  2.4  1.5  3.7  5.4 
Finland 0.6  1.0  1.1  1.7  2.8 
France 1.8  3.3  2.7  6.8  10.3 
Germany
1 2.1 4.5  -  -  - 
Greece 0.5  4.0  0.7 4.4 5.2 
Ireland 0.7  6.1  1.6  0.7  10.3 
Italy
2 - -  -  -  4.2 
Luxembourg 30.4  2.8  23.8  4.3  28.2 
The Netherlands  1.1  1.8  1.7  6.3  8.0 
Portugal 0.4  1.7  1.0  3.5  4.5 
Spain 0.6  3.4  1.0  4.5  5.5 
Sweden 2.1  2.2  4.3  7.9  12.2 
UK 2.0  3.2  2.7  6.3  8.9 
          
EU12:          
Bulgaria 0.02  0.1  0.04  0.2  0.3 
Cyprus 6.0  5.1  4.9  8.6  13.6 
Czech Republic  0.3  0.3 1.4  0.6 1.9 
Estonia 0.3  11.4  0.6  11.0  11.6 
Hungary 0.1  0.4  0.3  1.1  1.4 
Latvia 0.1  0.9
3 1.1 11.0 12.1 
Lithuania   0.1  0.4  0.3  3.8  4.0 
Malta -  -  -  -  - 
Poland 0.04  0.1  0.4  0.8  1.2 
Romania 0.01  0.2  0.02  0.04  0.1 
Slovakia 0.1  0.04  0.7  0.1  0.8 
Slovenia 0.02  0.3  0.6  6.0  6.6 
 
Source: Authors own tabulations from the EU Labour Force Survey, 2006. 
 
Note: “Other EU” and “Non EU” refer to the EU25 as region of reference.  
1 Data are from 2005.  
2 Neither nationality nor country of birth variables are available.  
3 The number for non-EU citizens is suspiciously low, and similar low numbers are reported in the 
2005 Labour Force Survey. This may arise because non-citizens were grouped together with 
nationals as in Eurostat Population Statistics (2006, p. 65). 
4 This total is based on information on the nationality, citizenship or years of residence variables in 





  19Table 3: Individual determinants of migration abroad intentions in Europe:  
Marginal effects from the multinomial Logit model 
 











































































































































Pseudo  R2  0.14 0.16 0.13 0.13 
Observations  5,021 4,748 8,081 8,627 
 
Source: Authors' estimation based on the data from Eurobarometers 64.1, 54.2 
and Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 2002.1. 
 
Notes: The dependent variable in the Logit model takes value one if a 
respondent replies that in the next five years she intends to move to another 
city within the same region, it takes value two if she intends to move to another 
region within the same country, it takes value three if she intends to move to 
another  EU or a non-EU country, and is zero otherwise. The table contains 
only the estimates for the move abroad. Elasticities are reported that show by 
how much the change in independent variable changes the dependent variable 
relative to the reference group of the stayers. (For dummy variables we report a 
discrete change from 0 to 1.) Only outcome for moving abroad is reported. 
Country dummies are included in all regressions. Standard errors are adjusted 
for clustering by country. The absolute values of the z-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4: Macroeconomic determinants of migration abroad intentions in Europe:  
Marginal effects from the multinomial Logit model 
 































Pseudo  R2  0.13 0.14 0.11 0.10 
Observations  5,021 4,748 8,081 8,627 
 
Source: Authors' estimation based on the data from Eurobarometers 64.1, 54.2 
and Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 2002.1.  
 
Notes: See Table 3 for references. The specification is the same with the 
exception that we replaced the country dummies by macro measures of the 












  21Table 5: Selected determinants of post-enlargement migration perceptions: 
Marginal effects from the Logit model 
 
 EU15  EU10 
Age   -0.002*  -0.003*** 
 (1.9)  (2.6) 
Female   0.029**  0.036** 
 (2.5)  (2.5) 
Years of schooling   -0.008***  -0.007*** 
 (4.0)  (2.9) 
Rural -0.032  -0.049** 
 (1.4)  (2.4) 
Left-oriented -0.038***  -0.009 
 (2.8)  (0.4) 
Center-oriented -0.016  0.008 
 (0.9)  (0.4) 
Blue-collar worker  0.044*  0.003 
 (1.7)  (0.1) 
Unemployed 0.040  0.023 
 (1.4)  (0.7) 
Student -0.105**  -0.059 
 (2.2)  (1.0) 
Pensioner 0.036*  0.012 
 (1.6)  (0.3) 
House work  0.006  0.007 
 (0.2)  (0.2) 
Pseudo R
2 0.12 0.09 
Observations 8,046  4,155 
 
 
Source: Authors' estimations based on the data from the 
Eurobarometer 65.2.  
 
Notes: The dependent variable equals to one if a 
respondent replies that migration flows after 2004 
enlargement were “important” and 0 if she replies that 
they were “limited”. Additional controls include marital 
status, immigrant dummies, household size, and countries 
fixed effects. Elasticities are reported that show by how 
much the change in independent variable changes the 
dependent variable relative to the reference group of the 
stayers. (For dummy variables we report a discrete change 
from 0 to 1.) Standard errors are adjusted for clustering by 
country, the absolute value of the z-statistic is reported in 
parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 













  22Table 6: Correlation between migration perception and actual migration flows: 
Marginal effects from Logit 
 
 EU15  EU10 
Migration flows, in % of w.a. population  0.207***  0.539*** 
 (6.0)  (2.7) 
GDP per capita  -0.047**  -0.023 
 (2.2)  (1.3) 
Unemployment rate  -0.021  -0.014 
 (1.1)  (1.3) 
Pseudo R
2 0.09 0.06 
Observations 7,817  4,155 
 
Source: Authors' estimations based on the data from the 
Eurobarometer 65.2. 
 
Notes: The dependent variable equals to one if a respondent replies 
that migration flows after 2004 enlargement were “important” and 0 if 
she replies that they were “limited”. Migration flows for the EU15 
refer to residence/work permits (in percent of destination country’s 
working age population) issued to the EU10 nationals after the 2004 
enlargement; for Luxembourg data are missing (see EU Commission, 
2006, Table A1). Migration flows for the EU10 are calculated from 
the Eurostat data on immigration into the respective EU15 countries in 
2005 (in percent of sending country’s working age population), data 
for Ireland and Greece are missing, data for Belgium and Italy are 
from 2003, France and Portugal from 2004. Additional controls 
include individual characteristics as in Table 5. Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering by country, absolute values of z-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. They are ** significant at 5% or *** 
significant at 1%. Note that the raw (unadjusted) correlation (marginal 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the data from the Eurostat online database ((www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat, June 2008).  
Notes: The two largest countries of origin from the EU12 together with the total net immigration rates are presented. Net flows are 
calculated as the difference between immigration and emigration flows for the respective countries of origin and destination divided 
by the host population size. For the UK gross immigration rates are presented, since data on emigration is missing for many countries 
and years.  
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Figure 2: Applicants to the Worker Registration Scheme, 












2004* 2005 2006 2007
TOTAL EU8 PL SK
 
 
Source: Data are from Home Office (2008), Table 3 and Eurostat.. 
 
Notes: Approved applicants and for initial application only.   
* 2004 includes May-December. PL refers to Poland and SK to 
Slovakia, EU8 to the eight countries from Eastern Europe that joined 
the EU in May 2004 together with Cyprus and Malta. 
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to another EU country to a non-EU country
 
Source: Authors' own tabulations from Eurobarometers 64.1, 54.2 and Central and Eastern Eurobarometer  
2002.1. 
 
Notes:  The sample includes individuals between 18 and 64 years old and excludes pensioners and students. 
 
 
  26Figure 4: Attitudes about post-enlargement migration, 2006: 




































Source: Authors' own tabulations from Eurobarometer 65.2.  
 

















Eurobarometer EB 54.2, January-February 2001: 
 
Do you think you will move in the next five years? Yes / No / DK 
 
a)  Do you intend to move within the same city, town or village in the next five years, or not? 
b)  And do you intend to move to another city, town or village within the same region, or not?” 
c)  And do you intend to move to another region within the same country, or not? 
d)  And do you intend to move to another country within the European Union, or not? 
e)  And do you intend to live in a country outside the European Union, or not? 
f)  Are you sure where you will move to, or not? 
 
 
Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1, March-April, 2002: 
 
Do you intend to move in the next five years? Yes / No / DK 
 
In the next five years do you intend to… 
a)  move within the same city, town or village? 
b)  move to another city, town or village within the same region? 
c)  move to another region within the same country? 
d)  move to another country within the Europe? 
e)  live in a country outside Europe? 
 
 
Eurobarometer EB 64.1, September-October 2005: 
 
Do you think that in the next five years you are likely to move…? 
a)  in the same city / town /village? 
b)  to another city / town / village, but in the same region? 
c)  to another region, but the same country? 
d)  to another country in the European Union? 
e)  to another country outside the European Union? 
f)  you don’t think you will move 
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Table A1: Non-national population (in thousands), 1990-2004 
 
  1990 1995 2000 2004 
EU15:      
Austria  434 677 699 765 
Belgium  881 922 897 860 
Denmark  151 197 259 271 
Finland  21 62 88  107 
France
1 3597  3263  
Germany  4846 7118 7336 7342 
Greece     761  891 
Ireland 81  96  127  215 
Italy   685  1271  1990 
Luxembourg  109 133 159 175 
Netherlands  642 757 652 702 
Portugal  101 157 191 239
2
Spain  398 461 924  2772 
Sweden  456 537 487 476 
United  Kingdom  2416  2460  2941 
EU12:      
Bulgaria     26
3  
Cyprus   37  58  65
2
Czech Republic      239  195 
Estonia     274   
Hungary    138 153 130 
Latvia
4    25  33 
Lithuania     34
3  
Malta  6 7 9  11 
Poland     700
5  
Romania      26 
Slovakia      30 
Slovenia    48 43 45 
 
Source: Eurostat (2006), Table C-10, p. 65. 
 
Notes:   
1 Census results 1990 and 1999;
   2 data are from 2003;       
3 Census results 2001; 
4 Including Latvian non-citizens (482 
thousand on 1 January 2004);  
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Table A2: Individual determinants of migration intentions in Europe after enlargement:  
Marginal effects from the multinomial Logit model 
 





















































































































































































































Pseudo R2  0.16  0.13 
Observations 4748  8627 
 
Source: Authors' estimation based on the data from Eurobarometers EB 64.1, 54.2 and Central and Eastern 
Eurobarometer 2002.1. 
 
Notes: The dependent variable in the Logit model takes value one if a respondent replies that in the next five years she 
intends to move to another city within the same region, it takes value two if she intends to move to another region 
within the same country, it takes value three if she intends to move to another  EU or a non-EU country, and is zero 
otherwise. Elasticities are reported that show by how much the change in independent variable changes the dependent 
variable relative to the reference group of the stayers. (For dummy variables we report a discrete change from 0 to 1.) 
Country dummies are included in all regressions. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering by country. The absolute 
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Table A3: Individual determinants of migration intentions in Europe before enlargement:  
Marginal effects from the multinomial Logit model 
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Pseudo R2  0.14  0.13 
Observations 5021  8081 
 
Source: Authors' estimation based on the data from Eurobarometers EB 64.1, 54.2 and Central and Eastern 
Eurobarometer 2002.1. 
 
Notes: The dependent variable in the Logit model takes value one if a respondent replies that in the next five years she 
intends to move to another city within the same region, it takes value two if she intends to move to another region 
within the same country, it takes value three if she intends to move to another  EU or a non-EU country, and is zero 
otherwise. Elasticities are reported that show by how much the change in independent variable changes the dependent 
variable relative to the reference group of the stayers. (For dummy variables we report a discrete change from 0 to 1.) 
Country dummies are included in all regressions. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering by country. The absolute 







  31Table A4: Macroeconomic determinants of migration intentions in Europe:  
Marginal effects from the multinomial Logit model 
 
  After the enlargement 











































Pseudo R2  0.14  0.10 
Observations 4748  8627 
  Before the enlargement 
  EU10, 2002  EU15, 2001 


























Pseudo R2  0.12  0.11 
Observations 5024  8081 
 
Source: Authors' estimation based on the data from Eurobarometers EB 64.1, 54.2 and Central and Eastern 
Eurobarometer 2002.1. 
 
Notes: The dependent variable in the Logit model takes value one if a respondent replies that in the next five years she 
intends to move to another city within the same region, it takes value two if she intends to move to another region 
within the same country, it takes value three if she intends to move to another  EU or a non-EU country, and is zero 
otherwise. Elasticities are reported that show by how much the change in independent variable changes the dependent 
variable relative to the reference group of the stayers. (For dummy variables we report a discrete change from 0 to 1.) 
Additional controls include individual characteristics as in Tables A2 and A3, country dummies are excluded. Standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering by country. The absolute value of the z-statistics are reported in parentheses. * 
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Table A5: The impact of inequality and education in EU10 after the enlargement:  




































Pseudo R2  0.14 
Observations 4748 
 
Source: Authors' estimation based on the data from Eurobarometer EB 64.1. 
 
Notes: The dependent variable in the Logit model takes value one if a respondent replies that in the next five years she 
intends to move to another city within the same region, it takes value two if she intends to move to another region 
within the same country, it takes value three if she intends to move to another  EU or a non-EU country, and is zero 
otherwise. Elasticities are reported that show by how much the change in independent variable changes the dependent 
variable relative to the reference group of the stayers. (For dummy variables we report a discrete change from 0 to 1.) 
Additional controls include individual characteristics as in Tables A2 and A3, country dummies are excluded. Standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering by country. The absolute value of the z-statistics are reported in parentheses. * 










  33Table A6: Characteristics of potential emigrants from EU10 and EU15 and of EU10 and EU15 immigrants in the UK 
 
      EU10 EU15
  Intend to move 
abroad, 2002 
Moved to UK 
in 2002-2004 
Intend to move 
abroad, 2005 
Moved to UK 
in 2005-2007 
Intend to move 
abroad, 2001 
Moved to UK 
in 2001-2004 
Intend to move 
abroad, 2005 
Moved to UK  
in 2005-2007 
Demographic  characteristics:          
Female  0.46               
                 
                 
                   
                 
m e n t :           
                 
                 
                 
        
                 
        
          
               
               
                 
               
               
                 
               
              
        
          
              
              
              
              
              
0.43 0.52 0.47 0.42 0.57 0.45 0.52
Age 31.21 31.31 33.06 28.78 34.06 34.19 36.97 32.01
Married  /  cohabiting 0.55 0.51 0.53 0.30 - 0.36 0.55 0.34
Have  children  <  16 y.o. 0.48 0.39 0.34 0.20 0.24 0.31 0.28 0.24
Years  of  schooling*
o y
14 14 14 14 15 15 15 16
I L O   E m p l
in  employment 0.71 0.87 0.67 0.83 0.80 0.83 0.77 0.80
unemployed 0.26 0.03 0.22 0.08 0.15 0.03 0.14 0.07
inactive
 
0.03 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.14 0.09 0.13
Self-employed
 
0.10 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.15 0.02
Industry  sector  (if  employed):
  agriculture  &  fishing 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 - 0.01 0.02 0
energy & water  0.02  0.01  0.02  0  -  0  0.02  0 
Manufacturing 
(Eurobarometer 2002: + mining and 
quarrying) 
0.15 0.31 0.14 0.26 - 0.17 0.05 0.14
Construction 0.07 0.16 0.11 0.09 - 0.05 0.07 0.03
distribution, hotels & restaurants 
(Eurobarometer 2005, 2002: wholesale and 
retail trade + hotels and restaurants) 
 
0.24 0.18 0.15 0.21 - 0.23 0.15 0.27
transport  &  communication 0.05 0.12 0.08 0.15 - 0.03 0.07 0.03
banking, finance & insurance etc  0.08  0.11  0.07  0.12  -  0.19  0.09  0.35 
public  admin,  educ  &  health
 
0.22 0.07 0.23 0.09 - 0.24 0.27 0.16
other  services 0.16 0.04 0.12 0.05 - 0.06 0.07 0.03
Eurobarometer  2005:  other  (spontaneous)
 
0.07 0.18
Occupation  UK  (if  employed):
managers  and  senior  officials 0.04 0.01 0.16 0.16
professional  occupations 0.04 0.03 0.19 0.26
associate  professional  and  technical 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.20
administrative  and  secretarial 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.04
skilled  trades  occupations 0.21 0.13 0.07 0.03
  34personal  service  occupations              
              
            
        
          
        
             
           
           
           
           
            
           
           
           
           
             
             
        
              
              
0.05 0.08 0.09 0.07
sales and customer service occupation    0.03    0.02    0.08    0.04 
process,  plant  and  machine  operatives
 
0.24 0.20 0.07 0.05
elementary  occupations
 
0.32 0.44 0.14 0.15
Occupation  Eurobarometer:
p l o y e d :   S e l f - e m
  Farmer 0 0.01 0.01 0
Professional (lawyer, medical practitioner, 
accountant, architect etc.) 
0.07 0.04 0.03 0.08
Owner of a shop, craftsmen, other self-
employed 
0.05 0.02 0.04 0.05
Business proprietors, owner (full or partner) 
of a company 
0.02 0.04 0.01 0.05
Employed professional (employed doctor, 
lawyer, accountant, architect) 
0.12 0.14 0.05 0.07
General management, director or top 
management (managing directors, director 
general, other director) 
0 0.02 0.04 0.05
Middle management, other management 
(department head, junior manager, teacher, 
technician) 
0.15 0.12 0.19 0.14
Employed position, working mainly at a 
desk 
0.13 0.13 0.20 0.15
Employed position, not at a desk, but 
travelling (salesmen, driver etc.) 
0.12 0.06 0.07 0.07
Employed position, not at a desk, but in a 
service job (hospital, restaurant, police, 
firemen etc.) 
0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Supervisor 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02
Skilled  manual  worker 0.15 0.20 0.15 0.11
Other (unskilled) manual worker, servant 
 
0.05    0.05    0.08    0.06   
Claim  benefits 0.27 0.09 0.26 0.09




















Source: Authors own tabulations from the UK Labour Force Survey 2007 first quarter, Eurobarometers EB 64.1, 54.2 and Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 2002.1. 
Notes: The sample excluded individuals younger than 18 and older than 64 years old, full-time students and pensioners. *generated as age when finished full-time education minus 6. 
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Table A7: Immigration policy. Opinion on the question: “We need immigrants to work in certain sectors of our economy” (in percent) 
 
 
                                  BE DK DE GR ES FI FR IE IT LU NL AT PT SE UK EU15
 2004 
totally  agree                             
                               
                               
                               
                             
                             
                               
                               
                             
                             
17.30 25.87 9.22 11.50 27.16 15.60 20.18 20.90 10.02 45.06 11.97 12.21 7.70 46.40 13.46 18.34 
tend  to  agree 28.70 32.29 24.60 19.60 36.76 37.81 37.66 40.50 38.02 32.81 22.45 30.78 29.10 34.40 36.23 31.92 
tend  to  disagree 30.30 22.95 28.19 23.20 17.65 24.88 21.08 17.80 27.21 13.64 30.07 27.21 35.40 10.80 19.21 23.70 
totally  disagree
 
23.00 16.05 36.32 45.10 16.10 21.13 18.08 12.90 20.83 5.14 34.22 25.72 23.10 6.60 27.61 23.27 
don't  know 0.70 2.83 1.67 0.60 2.33 0.59 3.00 7.90 3.93 3.36 1.29 4.07 4.70 1.80 3.48 2.77 
  2005 
  totally  agree 11.43 19.96 9.84 8.00 23.65 13.52 19.33 22.70 15.80 43.73 14.79 8.73 5.78 35.72 12.50 16.52 
tend  to  agree 34.47 34.79 23.21 22.20 32.61 39.01 33.99 43.31 44.10 36.67 33.05 32.94 33.20 39.79 36.67 34.27 
tend  to  disagree 28.32 25.10 30.57 28.50 18.33 24.22 21.61 15.36 21.30 11.37
 
29.88 31.47 32.40 11.52 24.47 24.27 
totally  disagree
 
24.80 15.99 34.68 41.00 16.65 22.28 21.11 10.11 13.60 6.67 19.79 22.35 22.53 11.23 20.53 21.13 
don't  know 0.98 4.17 1.69 0.30 8.77 0.97 3.96 8.52 5.20 1.57 2.50 4.51 6.08 1.74 5.83 3.82 
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Table A8: Past and future of labour migration in Europe. 
Answers on the question: “Have you, yourself, ever considered living in another Member State in order to work?”  Feb-Mar 2006 (in percent) 
 
 
  EU15 
                               
                             
BE DK DE GR ES FI FR IE IT LU NL AT PT SE UK
TOTAL 
EU15 
yes, you have already done 
it  7.75 7.58 4 3.2 3.67 5.48 3.62 6.6 3.39 15.94 10.73 5.38 5.34 6.79 6.05 5.98 
yes, you think of it , but you 
haven't  decided  yet  9.61                             
                             
                             
                               
12.67 10.42 6.1 4.26 11.95 7.53 7.5 7.78 5.58 6.59 8.07 5.84 11.99 9.38 8.52 
yes, you have already 
thought of it, but gave up the 
idea  12.94 14.97 12.45 5.8 6.34 12.95 10.67 7.7 11.57 7.37 16.48 13.26 11.77 13.19 9.15 11.26 
no, you have never thought 
of  it  68.63 63.57 72.87 84.5 83.65 68.92 76.61 72.7 72.48 69.92 64.78 70.99 75.77 67.23 73.68 72.52 
don't  know 1.08 1.2 0.26 0.4 2.08 0.7 1.57 5.5 4.79 1.2 1.41 2.31 1.29 0.8 1.74 1.72 
 
 
  EU10 
                     
                   
CY CZ EE HU LV LT MA PL SK SI
TOTAL 
EU10 
yes, you have already done 
it  2.76 0.97 4.48 2.58 3.64 3.69 2.4 3.3 4.58 4.17 3.34 
yes, you think of it , but you 
haven't  decided  yet  7.87                   
                   
                   
                     
8.78 16.42 10.8 21.46 20.02 6.6 18 16.3 12.89 14.64 
yes, you have already 
thought of it, but gave up 
the  idea  4.33 13.22 12.34 11 12.3 10.56 5.2 13.1 25 15.73 13.24 
no, you have never thought 
of it  84.06 75.1 63.98 74.53 61.71 62.75 84.4 63 52.38 66.16 66.98 
don't  know 0.98 1.93 2.79 1.09 0.89 2.99 1.4 2.6 1.74 1.04 1.8 
 
Source: authors’ tabulations from the Eurobarometer EB 65.1.  
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